"Laying" the Table for the Controversy Over Semicha

This sheet is part of a series of source sheets related to Mishnayos Chagigah. Other sheets include:

• Mishnayos Chagigah: A running Commentary (https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/64672)
• Sources for Mesechtas Chaggah (https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/64137)

This source sheet provides background material for the controversy over Semicha. Translations are from Sefaria.

Source 6

The following sources, the Tosefta, Talmud Yerushalmi and Talmud Bavli expand and expound on the dispute over Semicha. The sources can be broken down into three distinct topics.

1. The history of Halachik Disputes (Machlokes) --These are highlighted in yellow.
2. The particular dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel over Semicha on Yom Tov--These are highlighted in blue
3. A story of Hillel Hazaken and his attempt to bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov and how a member of Beis Shammai helped establish the Halacha like Hillel. These are highlighted in purple.

The sources create an idyllic picture of Halachik history. At first, any time there was uncertainty or a difference of opinion over a particular Halacha, they would pose the question to the great 71-member Sanhedrin that sat inside the Beis HaMikdash. If someone had a tradition as to the proper rule (אם שמעו אמרו) they would accept the tradition. Otherwise, the august group would vote and determine the Halacha according to the majority. For reasons we will discuss, the one issue they could not resolve was the dispute over Semicha. Following Shammai and Hillel, their students no longer were capable of properly being instructed and from then on disputes multiplied.

As noted above, embedded within the Machlokes over Semicha on Yom Tov are two disputes. First, whether one may bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov. According to Beis Shammai one cannot bring an Olah since it is wholly burnt rather than eaten, there is no purpose for such a Korban on Yom Tov. Beis Hillel permits a person to bring a Korban Olah on Yom Tov based on the principal that how can we concern ourselves with our food and not also be concerned with Hashem's. However, everyone agrees that you can bring a Shelamim on Yom Tov.

Separately, they argue whether or not one is permitted to perform Semicha on Yom Tov itself (whether for the Korban Olah according to Beis Hillel and the Shelamim according to everyone). According to Beis Shammai, you are permitted to do Semicha prior to bringing the Korban; consequently, he does not permit a person to violate the Rabbinic prohibition on using an animal on Yom Tov. According to Beis Hillel, however, one can only perform Semicha at the time of bringing the Korban and cannot do so earlier. When pitting the obligation to perform Semicha against the Rabbinic prohibition on using animals on Yom Tov, he allows Semicha to be performed.

Taking a step back, on a very practical level this dispute had meaningful consequences for the population. According to Beis Shammai a person who could not make the trek to the Beis HaMikdash (whether for the Festivals or any other time) could still send Korbonos and participate in ritual life since he could perform Semicha at home and send his Korban with a Shaliach. Whereas, according to Beis Hillel, this is Halachacily impermissible, and such a person would not be able to participate in the Temple ritual.

According to the sources, both disputes were eventually resolved. The sources vary slightly but the major details remain the same. The Talmud Yerushalmi's version is the most dramatic retelling. Briefly, Hillel once arrived at the Beis HaMikdash on Yom Tov prepared to bring a Korban Olah. Shammai's students quickly surround him (in an effort to prevent an Olah from being brought) and Hillel resorts to obfuscating the gender of the animal and pretends it is a female (which cannot be used for an Olah) and that he is bringing a Shelamim. Shammai's students invariably decide it's time to bring an end to the dispute by bringing the matter to a vote.

However, one student, Bava ben Butah knew that the Halachah was like Beis Hillel. According to the Yerushalmi's retelling, Bava was inspired/prompted by the reality of the fact that under Beis Shammai's paradigm the Beis HaMikdash was empty on Yom Tov. Rather than teeming with people it was desolate. Perhaps as a result of not being able to perform Semicha--while not absolutely required, it was very much a part of the Korban process for people--people refrained from bringing any Korbnos (including Shelamim) on Yom Tov. Preferring to wait until Chol HaMoed or after Shavuous when they could bring the Korban in the preferred manner.

To remedy the situation Bava went out and brought 3,000 animals to the Beis HaMikdash and urged the population to come and bring them--including allowing them to perform Semicha. And with that display he established the Halacha like Beis Hillel. Presumably as to both permitting Olos on Yom Tov and allowing Semicha to be performed at the same time. [One interesting note is whether the allowance of Semicha was only according to Hillel's rule that it must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering the animal or was it even according to Shammai who allowed you to perform Semicha earlier if need be. In other words, did they change the requirement for Semicha or did they dispense with the Rabbinic prohibition on using animals even when not directly conflicting with Semicha].

[My read of the sources suggest that Shammai's students were more concerned over an Olah being brought than whether or not Hillel was going to perform Semicha. The former would impugn the Beis HaMikdash as a whole (i.e., by having to be burnt on the Mizbeach) whereas, Hillel's desire to perform Semicha was a personal choice. However, all of the Bava ben Butah sources have him exhorting the population to come and bring Korbonos and to perform Semicha. This suggests that he was concerned with both issues. This then requires an explanation why the next statement in each of these sources is about a student of Hillel's bringing a Korban and performing Semicha who is stopped by a student of Shammai's demanding the former not perform Semicha. Hillel's student shuts down the objection with seemingly positive results. (I.e., establishing that Semicha can be performed on Yom Tov). While it may simply be a secondary form of support it does seem like it is meant to establish the Semicha rule. See Lieberman, Tosephta Kepshuta, Moed, pp 1200, n. 42 suggesting that Shammai and Hillel only disputed Semicha, it was their students who added the dispute of Korbnei Olah on Yom Tov.]

Source 8

All of the above discussion assumes (as does the Talmud and all traditional Meforshim) that the Zugos were arguing whether or not Semicha on a Korban was permitted on Yom Tov. While it's clear what Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel were arguing over, it's not 100% clear that that is what the Zugos were arguing about. While the Mishna uses the terminology לסמוך ושלא לסמוך , nonetheless, it's not exactly the same. Among the Scholars, there has been much discussion as to the nature of the dispute. While many agree with the Gemara's conclusion, others have tried to find suitable substitutes. What follows is a brief recap.

Guiding the discussions are observations and questions like:

• Why would Beis Shammai disrupt the bringing of Korbonos over a Shevus of leaning on an animal?
• the juxtaposition of the two Mishnayos in Chagigah.
• What was it about this dispute that could not be resolved over so many generations?
• Why is there a need for a separate dispute by Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel?
• The Tosefta says איזו היא סמיכה שנחלקו עליה regarding Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel and if they are the same as the Zugos why the limiting nature of the question?

Reliance and the Authority of the Chachomim and Tradition: According to Solomon Zeitlin, the subject of the Zugos's dispute is not over physical Semicha on an animal, rather it is over the reliance on and the authority of the Chahcomim. In other words, how much to be "סומך" on the Chachomim's traditions and innovations in Halacha. He attempts to prove this dispute transcended all five generations of Zugos by identifying identifying Halachos each of them said and showing how they can be attributed to their views of how much or, if at all, to rely on the changing traditions of the Chachomim.particular statements of Halachos each of them said and showing how they can be attributed t o their views over reliance on the Chachomim. One cogent point he makes is that according to his understanding, we can add Mishna 2:2 to the prior set of Mishanyos dealing with the types and nature of Torah Shel Ba'al Peh, i.e., this Mishna concludes that grouping. Solomon Zeitlin, The Semikah Controversy between the Zugoth, JQR, New Series 4:4 pp 499-517. For Zeitlin's exposition on Shammai and Hillel's dispute over Semicha on Yom Tov see, Solomon Zeitlin, The Semikah COntorversy between the School of Shammai and Hillel, JQR, New Series, 56:3 pp. 240-244.

Laying of hands at time of Ordination: Some scholars have suggested that the preserved dispute is whether or not rabbinic ordination required the laying of the hands on the student's head. The ambiguity can be seen in the differing interpretations given by traditional commentators to the opening line of Mishna 1:3 in Sanhedrin. There is says, סְמִיכַת זְקֵנִים וַעֲרִיפַת עֶגְלָה, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. Many of the commentators, taking their que from the Gemara and the context of the Mishna, understand the Mishna to be referring to Semicha on a Korban. Specifically, the special Korban brought by the Court when a wrongful ruling is relied and acted upon by the majority of the people. The Rambam, on the other hand, interprets our Mishna as referring to Rabbinic Ordination. Others, including the R"AV and Yachin suggest that the Mishna is referring to both scenarios. Either way, it highlights the ambiguity of the term Samach. See sources and rebuttal at Lawrence A. Hoffman, The Origins of Ordination, in Rabbinic Authority, Papers Presented before he Ninety-First Annual Convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis ("CCAR"), Vol. XC, Part Two, Ed., Elliot L. Stevens, CCAR Press 1982, pp. 71-94 notes 1-10.

Traditionalist Views: Even among those who accept the traditional interpretation that the Zugos' controversy is over Semicha on an animal, they nonetheless dispute the contours and the particulars of the dispute.

• Zecharias Frankel, Darchei HaMishna, Breslau pp. 43-44 suggests that while the dispute may have started over the appropriateness of Semicha on Yom Tov, as noted above, underlying that that dispute was how you viewed the core obligation of Semicha. Was it simply the preferred way to bring a Korban or was it obligatory? Allowing Semicha on Yom Tov meant it was likely obligatory and if obligatory, that meant those who lived far from the Beis HaMikdash could not send Korbonos. [per the Gemarah eve according to Beis Shammai they could perform Semicha the day before--but perhaps he does not read that into the Mishna.] According to Frankel, this dispute proved wider and enveloped Korbonos throughout the year. The Chachomim, rather than resolving the issue, allowed it to remain an open question thus allowing each individual to choose whether to come and perform Semicha or send his Korban to the Beis HaMikdash without performing Semicha.
• Isaac Hersh Weiss, Dor Dor V'Dorshav, Vol. 1, pp 98, takes exception to Frankel's limitation and argues that the controversy was over Semicha on Yom Tov and the reason it lasted so long was that it was, in part, the prototype for the developing disputes among the Peirushim and Tziddukim. At its core, the Machlokes whether to perform Semicha in the face of a Rabbinic prohibition. Pitting the Biblical imperative against the Rabbinic injunction.
• Yaakov Halevy, Otzar Nechmad, Vol. 3, Isaac Blumenfeld editor, Wien, 1860, pp. 27-40, takes this to the extreme, identifying the dispute in our Mishna as a vestige of a dispute with the Essene's. According to Blumenfeld, the Essene's viewed themselves as always being ritually impure, preventing them from approaching the Beis HaMikdash and bringing a Korban. Recognizing, however, that to completely disengage from the Temple ritual would mean cutting themselves off from the entirety of the Jewish nation, they needed to figure out a way to still bring Korbonos. This was not only an issue for the Festivals, but for everyday life. The major impediment was the obligation to perform Semicha immediately prior to the slaughtering of the animal--an impossibility for the Essenes. However, if they could reinterpret the obligation to one of discretionary conduct, they could then send their Korbonos to the Beis HaMikdash. This line of thinking is rather extreme and also is problematic as he takes the liberty of identifying many of the Tanaim in our Misha as being Essenes.
• E. E. Halevy, Tarbiz, Teves 5719, pp. 154-157: views the controversy from a sociological perspective. [Some of this is incorporated above in my explanation of the sources]. It is clear that Semicha was an integral part of the Korban process. It was the most participatory aspect of the Korban and, therefore, the most meaningful. In the absence of being able to perform Semicha the people stopped bringing Korbonos, hence the desolation of the Beis HaMikdash even though everyone agreed they could bring Shelamim. He goes one step further and suggests that at its core, the Machlokes between the Zugos and Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel was over the character of the Beis HaMikdash during the Festivals. Would it have a somber and staid feel in line with the auspicious nature of the day or would it have a more carnivalesque feel with multitudes streaming in through the gates with their Korbonos, creating a ruckus and much joyous atmosphere. Those who wanted the former, understood that limiting the performance of Semicha would have the natural effect of drastically limiting the quantum and quantity of Korbonos. In other words, the prohibition or permissibility of Semicha was a proxy for their perception as to and over the nature of the Beis HaMikdash on the Yomim Tovim.
• Chanoch Albeck, Shisha Sidre Mishna, Moed, p. 511, collecting and rejecting various interpretations and upholding the traditional view.
• Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Kapshutah, Vol. 5, pp 1200, citing Albeck, E.E Halevy and Yaakov Halevy favorably.